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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Community for Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV")
applied for and received from the National Park Service ("Park
Service") a renewable seven day permit to establish symbolic tent
cities on the Mall and in Lafayette Park in Washington, D.C. Vol-
unteers planned to construct and man the tent cities during the
winter to publicize the plight of the homeless. The Park Service
allowed CCNV to erect tents and maintain day and night vigils
during which the demonstrators might sit, stand, or lay down in
the tents. Park regulations, however, forbade sleeping in the park
for more than four hours.'
Although the Park Service permitted limited sleeping, it de-
nied CCNV's request to allow the demonstrators to sleep in the
tents overnight. The Park Service explained that sleeping in the
tents would constitute impermissible camping, as defined by its
regulations. Park Service regulations permitted camping in the
national parks in designated campgrounds; however, the Mall and
Lafayette Park were not designated campgrounds.8
CCNV sought to enjoin the Park Service from applying the
1. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
2. The regulations defined "camping" as:
[T]he use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activ-
ities, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for
the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or
using any tents or ... other structure ... for sleeping or doing any digging or
earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities.
36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1982).
3. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3067 (1984)
("CCNV").
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camping regulation to the CCNV demonstration. They claimed
that application of the regulation to the demonstration would vio-
late their first amendment free speech rights.4 A federal district
court denied the injunction and granted summary judgment in
favor of the Park Service.' The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed,6 holding that the Park Service's application of
the camping regulation to deny CCNV the right to sleep overnight
as part of their demonstration violated CCNV's first amendment
free speech rights. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed and held that the Park Service's refusal to grant
permission for the demonstrators to sleep overnight in the sym-
bolic tent cities, as mandated by the Park Service regulations, did
not violate the demonstrators' rights to freedom of speech under
the first amendment.
7
Historically, the courts have used two tests to scrutinize gov-
ernmental regulations which restrict expressive conduct (also
known as symbolic speech). The first test, the time, place, and
manner test, applies to all modes of expression, whether written,
oral, or symbolic. The test permits regulation of expression if the
regulations are "justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, . . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and. . . leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the information."8
The Supreme Court articulated the second test in United
States v. O'Brien.9 The O'Brien0 test applies to situations where
the conduct itself contains an expressive element. The O'Brien test
permits regulation of expression if the regulation:
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest."
Before applying either test, the court usually determines
4. 703 F.2d at 587.
5. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, No. 82-02501 (D.C. 1982).
6. 703 F.2d at 599-600.
7. 104 S. Ct. at 3072.
8. Id. at 3069.





whether the disputed behavior is the type protected by the first
amendment. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt,
the court of appeals focused much of its attention on whether the
act of sleeping in the tents during the demonstration was an ex-
pression protected by the first amendment. 2 On appeal to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, Justice White, writing for the
Court, mooted the issue. He assumed, without deciding, that sleep-
ing in the park, under the facts of this case, was a form of speech
for first amendment purposes.
13
The Court then applied both tests to the facts.' The tests,
when combined, prescribe five requirements. The regulation must:
1) be within the constitutional power of the government; 2) leave
alternative channels open for communicating the message; 3) be
content-neutral; 4) be narrowly drawn, or no "greater" than neces-
sary to serve its purpose; and 5) serve a "significant," "substan-
tial," or "important" governmental interest.
Not all five of the factors were pertinent to the Supreme
Court's disposition of CCNV. CCNV did not challenge the regula-
tion's content-neutrality. 15 They did not argue that protection of
12. 703 F.2d at 591-94, 601-03, 605-08, 610-13, 622-27. For a proposed test for distin-
guishing expressive (protected) and nonexpressive (unprotected) conduct, see Note, First
Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1984).
13. 104 S. Ct. at 3068-69. Justice White avoided the question of whether the conduct
(sleeping in tents) was within the scope of first amendment protection by stating that the
regulation was constitutional even if first amendment rights were implicated. Id. Chief Jus-
tice Warren applied identical reasoning in O'Brien, to avoid the same issue many years ear-
lier. 391 U.S. at 376-77.
The Court then has consistently refused to demarcate a line where the first amendment
content of expressive conduct ceases to be significant. As Justices Harlan and Brennan
pointed out in Cowgill v. California, "The Court has, as yet, not established a test for deter-
mining at what point conduct becomes so intertwined with expression that it becomes nec-
essary to weigh the State's interest in proscribing conduct against the constitutionally pro-
tected interest in freedom of expression." 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970). Chief Justice Burger, in
his concurrence in CCNV, would have held that sleeping "simply [was] not speech." 104 S.
Ct. at 3072. Given the ease and utility of the "fails anyway" technique, the Court may never
find it necessary to resolve the scope issue.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 3071.
15. Id. at 3071-72. Justice Marshall agreed that the regulation was content-neutral, but
he objected that "[b]y narrowly limiting its concern to whether a given regulation creates a
content-based distinction, the Court has seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral
restrictions are also capable of unnecessarily restricting protected expressive activity." Id. at
3079. Justice Marshall pointed out that such restrictions bear more heavily on those who
lack the resources to communicate in conventional ways. Id. at n.14. In Justice Marshall's
view, the Court transformed the requirement of content-neutrality from "a floor that offers
all persons at least equal liberty under the First Amendment into a ceiling that restricts
persons to the protection of First Amendment equality - but nothing more." Id. at 3079.
A regulation can be facially neutral, although the government may have promulgated it
19851
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the parks was not within the power of the government, nor that
CCNV could not deliver its message to the media or the public in
any other way. 6 The Court focused on two issues: 1) whether the
regulation furthered a substantial governmental interest, and 2)
whether the Court should require the Park Service to protect the
parks through less restrictive means. This casenote explores the
Court's treatment of these last two factors.
II. FURTHERING A SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
Under the time, place, and manner test, if a regulation "serves
a significant governmental interest," a court will uphold the regu-
lation, even though it incidentally infringes first amendment
rights.1 7 Similarly, under the O'Brien test, a court will uphold a
regulation if it "furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest."' s The qualifiers "significant," "important," and "sub-
stantial" suggest that there may be situations in which a govern-
mental interest will not be "important" enough to validate the in-
fringing regulation.1'
How does a court measure the importance of a governmental
interest? Under the accepted dogma, the court "balances" the gov-
ernmental interest against the first amendment right.2 0 This bal-
for nonneutral reasons. Governmental agencies issued several of the regulations discussed in
this casenote specifically to curtail the expressive activities of those (or their brethren in
spirit) who later challenged them. The Park Service promulgated the anticamping regula-
tion in CCNV after a court ruled, based on the previous regulation, that the Park Service
could not constitutionally bar CCNV from camping in the park during its demonstration.
See 703 F.2d at 587-88. It may be true, as Justice White points out, that "the regulation
'responds precisely to the substantive problems which legitimately concern the [Govern-
ment].'" CCNV, 104 S. Ct. at 3071 (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S.
Ct. 2118 (1984)). Yet because the judiciary will not, when faced with a content-neutral regu-
lation, inquire into an allegedly illicit legislative or executive motive, a legislature or an
executive agency may be free to curtail expressive conduct by enacting content-neutral laws
or promulgating content-neutral regulations.
16. 104 S. Ct. at 3072.
17. See supra text accompanying note 8.
18. See supra text accompanying note 11.
19. In O'Brien, the Court described "the quality of the governmental interest which
must appear . . . [as] compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong."
391 U.S. at 376-77.
20. In Schneider v. State, the Court stated that its task, when confronted with a regula-
tion that incidentally limits rights of free expression, was "to weigh the circumstances and
to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of the rights." 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). For further discussions of balancing,
see Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. REv. 387 (1979); Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALz L.J. 1424, 1425 (1962); Meiklejohn, First Amendment
is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. Rev. 245, 251.
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ancing process has received perfunctory homage in the past.2' The
Court in CCNV, however, never mentioned balancing, and with
good reason.
First amendment cases rarely pit a governmental interest di-
rectly against the first amendment.22 Rather, the cases tend to fo-
cus on the degree to which a regulation effectively furthers a gov-
ernmental interest.23 It is the "furtherance of the interest," rather
than the interest itself, that must stand or fall in the face of the
first amendment. 24 The court of appeals took this approach in up-
holding CCNV's claims.
The court of appeals said the Park Service's denial of over-
night sleeping was of "minimal consequence" in furthering the
government's interest in protecting the parks. Indeed, the court
suggested that the parks might positively benefit if the demonstra-
tors were asleep at night.2" When the case reached the Supreme
Court, however, the Court did not limit its "furtherance" analysis
to the particular demonstration at hand. The Court cited Heffron
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness26 as authority
for the proposition that "this regulation need not be judged solely
21. In Konigsberg v. State, for example, the Court affirmed the propriety of "general
regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting
its unfettered exercise. . . " 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961). The Court stated that its analysis of
conflicting first amendment and governmental interests in such cases "has necessarily in-
volved a weighing of the governmental interest involved." Id. at 51.
22. Konigsberg provides a rare example of true balancing. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
23. "Flag cases" and aesthetic regulation cases are two areas in which there has been
noticeable evolution in the Court's perception of the legitimacy of the stated governmental
interest. The Court has backed away from the notion that the state can enforce school flag
salute rules against people whose principles constrain them not to salute. See infra text
accompanying notes 80-81. The Court has not resolved the question of whether a state has
an enforceable interest in the physical integrity of the flag. See Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1973).
24. The dissent in CCNV suggested that the Court should require that regulations sub-
stantially further governmental interests before the need for the regulations could outweigh
the right to freedom of speech. 104 S. Ct. at 3076-77.
25. 703 F.2d at 598. Judge Mikva suggested that the parks might benefit if the Park
Service allowed the protesters to sleep at night (as opposed to staying awake all night):
Indeed, allowing an all-night presence by wakeful protestors would seem to tax
sanitation facilities, law enforcement personnel, and the park resource itself to a
greater extent than would allowing those same protestors simply to sleep.
• ..If anything, the nighttime enjoyment of Lafayette Park and the Mall
by nondemonstrators would probably be enhanced if the 150 CCNV demonstra-
tors were asleep.
Id. at 596-97.
26. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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by reference to the demonstration at hand. 2 7
In Heffron, the Court examined a Minnesota State Fair rule
that required all merchandise, including written material, to be
distributed from booths. The International Society for Krishna
Consciousness (ISKCON) challenged the rule as an unlawful in-
fringement of its first amendment free speech right to distribute
literature and solicit donations on foot, as commanded by their
faith."8
The Fair's organizers claimed that the rule was necessary to
prevent congestion of fair thoroughfares. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that the rule violated ISKCON's first amendment
right to freedom of speech. The decision turned on the significance
of the state's interest in avoiding whatever disorder would likely
result from granting members of ISKCON an exemption from the
rule. The court concluded that the anticipated disruption was in-
sufficient to justify infringement of ISKCON's first amendment
rights, and thus, the rule was unconstitutional as applied to
ISKCON.29
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and upheld
the booth rule as a valid time, place, and manner restriction.80 The
Court said the exemption could not be "meaningfully limited" to
ISKCON; all "similarly situated groups" would have to be ex-
empted.8 ' The Court said ISKCON's practices did not merit
greater first amendment protection than those of any other group
that espoused religious, social, political, or ideological messages.82
Although the rule might have no appreciable effect on crowd con-
trol when applied only to ISKCON, the Court said, when applied
to all, it would achieve its intended effect."
27. 104 S. Ct. at 3070.
28. 452 U.S. at 643-45.
29. Id. at 646.
30. Id. at 654.
31. Id.
32. ISKCON did not attempt to argue that it could make any special claim to first
amendment protection. Id. at 652 n.15.
33. As Justice Brennan said in partial dissent, "If fairgoers can make speeches, engage
in face-to-face proselytizing, and buttonhole prospective supporters, they can surely dis-
tribute literature to members of their audience without significantly adding to the State's
asserted crowd control problem." Id. at 661.
He was quick to point out that the Court had reached the opposite conclusion in Tinker
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). To protest the Vietnam War, Tinker wore a
black armband to public school in violation of a school board regulation forbidding arm-
bands. Although the Court recognized the prerogative of school boards to control students'
conduct, it was unwilling to allow "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [to]
justify a total ban on purely expressive activity." Id. at 508. To Justice Brennan, the Hef-
[Vol. 39:997
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In the court of appeals, both the majority and the dissents rec-
ognized the applicability of Heffron to CCNV; yet they reached
different conclusions. According to the majority, the phrase "simi-
larly situated groups" meant "all those who wish to engage in
sleeping as part of their demonstration and have been granted re-
newable permits to demonstrate on a twenty-four hour basis on
sites at which they have also been allowed to erect temporary sym-
bolic structures."'8 The dissenters took a much broader view of
"similarly situated" and said, "[W]e must look to the interest in
preventing camping by all classes of persons, whatever their
motive."35
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed
with the dissenters:
Absent the prohibition on sleeping, there would be other groups
who would demand permission to deliver an asserted message by
camping in Lafayette Park. Some of them would surely have as
credible a claim in this regard as does CCNV, and the denial of
permits to still others would present difficult problems for the
Park Service."
The Court adopted an all-or-nothing approach: either everybody
could camp, or nobody could. It was unwilling to allow the Park
Service to judge which applicants had valid first amendment rea-
sons for sleeping in the parks, and which did not.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, referred to the apprehension of a
deluge of campers as the "imposter problem. 3 7 The "imposter
problem" arises due to the interaction of two first amendment
principles-overbreadth and content neutrality. The overbreadth
doctrine is an exception to traditional rules of standing. Under the
overbreadth doctrine, the Court may allow one party to challenge
regulations or statutes where the Court predicts or assumes that
the existence of the regulation or statute may cause others, not
before the Court, to refrain from constitutionally protected speech
or expression." Under the content-neutrality doctrine, the govern-
ment is forbidden from considering the nature of a message when
fron Court's expectation that increased disruption would result from numerous first amend-
ment claimants on the Minnesota fairgrounds was just this sort of undifferentiated fear. 452
U.S. at 662.
34. 703 F.2d 586, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
35. Id. at 616.
36. 104 S. Ct. at 3071.
37. Id. at 3075.
38. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973).
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formulating regulations that curtail expression of the message. 9
These two doctrines fit into the "imposter" argument in a cir-
cular manner. Each party that seeks exemption from a regulation
represents an untold number of similar applicants (a version of the
overbreadth doctrine); the Park Service is forbidden from ques-
tioning the sincerity or validity of the asserted first amendment
message of any applicant (a requirement of the content-neutrality
doctrine); therefore, the Park Service must grant all requested per-
mits. This result, however, threatens serious damage to the parks.
To avoid such damage, the Park Service must deny all applicants.
Justice Marshall objected to this reasoning on several grounds.
He objected, as Justice Brennan had in Heffron,40 to submission to
the "mere apprehension of disturbance" which the Park Service
might face. He also objected to the Court's refusal to differentiate
between valid and invalid first amendment claims, and cited situa-
tions in which the government routinely makes such a
distinction.4'
Justice Marshall concluded that the use of the content-neu-
trality doctrine in this case resulted in an ironic perversion of its
original purpose. Although the doctrine had been created to ex-
pand freedom of speech, the Court's preoccupation with the "im-
poster problem" resulted in a limitation of expressive freedom, and
transformed "the ban against content-distinctions from a floor that
offer[ed] all persons at least equal liberty under the First Amend-
ment into a ceiling that restrict[ed] persons to the protection of
First Amendment equality - but nothing more.''4
The preceding examination of the requirement that a regula-
tion "further a substantial governmental interest" leads to several
conclusions. 43 First, the modifier "substantial" is misplaced. It is
the substantiality of the "furtherance" of the interest, and not the
substantiality of the interest, that a Court is to determine. Second,
39. See supra text accompanying note 11.
40. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). Justice Brennan said, "[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id. at 662
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
41. As examples of that type of inquiry, Justice Marshall specified Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Under Yoder, mem-
bers of a group holding "deep religious conviction" might be exempt from compulsory edu-
cation laws. 406 U.S. at 215-16. Similarly, in Welsh, the Court required the Selective Service
System, in conferring conscientious objector status, to distinguish between those who oper-
ate under a personal, moral, or philosophical code, and those whose consciences are moti-
vated "by a deeply held moral, ethical, or religious belief." 398 U.S. at 343-44.
42. 104 S. Ct. 3079.
43. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
1004 [Vol. 39:997
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using the Heffron approach, a court must consider the effect of a
regulation on all potential first amendment claimants, and not just
on the parties before the court." The result is that even where the
government derives no benefit from the application of a regulation
to a particular party, a court may uphold the regulation if its uni-
versal application will result in the desired benefit. The law will
not favor exceptions. Thus, the Court said in CCNV:
If the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the
National Parks are adequately protected, which we think it has,
and if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the
sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalida-
tion under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation on
the manner in which a demonstration may be carried out.4"
III. THE NARROWNESS OF THE REGULATION
Both the time, place, and manner test and the O'Brien test
have a narrowness requirement. Under the time, place, and man-
44. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
45. 104 S. Ct. at 3071. The Court's refusal to balance the governmental interest against
the first amendment dovetails with the use of the "fails anyway" approach. See supra note
13. Through the "fails anyway" approach, the Court avoids the need to define the limits of
the first amendment. Similarly, by concentrating on the regulation's furtherance of the gov-
ernmental interest, rather than on the "importance" of that interest, the Court avoids the
unsavory task of assigning relative weights to such intangible concepts.
Neither the government, nor Justice Marshall, favors the Court's avoidance of line
drawing and balancing through the use of the "fails anyway" approach. Their positions are
well illustrated in Justice Marshall's CCNV dissent, which contains an implied colloquy be-
tween the government and Justice Marshall. The government urged the Court to hold that,
under no circumstances, could "sleep" qualify for first amendment protection. According to
the government, a contrary holding would logically place even political assassinations within
first amendment limits. Justice Marshall responded that "balancing" would avoid such an
absurd result:
The Government's argument would pose a difficult problem were the determina-
tion whether an act constitutes "speech" the end of First Amendment analysis.
But such a determination is not the end. If an act is defined as speech, it must
still be balanced against countervailing government interests. The balancing
which the First Amemdment requires would doom any argument seeking to pro-
tect anti-social acts such as assassination or destruction of government property
from government interference because compelling interests would outweigh the
expressive value of such conduct.
104 S. Ct. at 3076.
The Court's approach in CCNV was much simpler. It circumvented the need to balance.
Applying the reasoning of CCNV to the assassination situation would reap the following
result: Because the law which forbids assassination is content-neutral and leaves open other
avenues for expression, and because the goal of protecting the lives of public figures is both
valid and significant, and is furthered by the law, the law is valid, whether or not an assassi-
nation is a "first amendment act."
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ner test, a narrowly drawn statute or regulation must serve a sig-
nificant governmental interest."' Under the O'Brien test, the re-
sulting restriction on first amendment freedoms must be "no
greater than is essential to the furtherance" of the governmental
interest.'
7
Courts have used the narrowness requirement in the past to
invalidate oppressive laws without reaching thorny constitutional
questions. In Stromberg v. California," the first case in which the
Court invalidated a law on first amendment grounds, the Court in-
validated a state statute only because the law was capable of
prohibiting benign behavior. The statute prohibited public display
of a red flag as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to organ-
ized government. 9 Stromberg was convicted for leading a chil-
dren's camp in saluting a red flag. The Court voided the statute
because a court could theoretically construe it to prohibit legiti-
mate as well as illegitimate opposition to the government.
50
The Court also applied a narrowness analysis in Schneider v.
State.5 1 Schneider was convicted for passing out leaflets in viola-
tion of a municipal antilitter ordinance. The Court held in Schnei-
der's favor because it found that the municipality could achieve its
legitimate goal of maintaining clean streets by narrower means
which did not limit the dissemination of information. The Court
suggested punishment of those persons who actually threw papers
on the streets, rather than a general restriction on distribution.
52
In effect, the Court required the municipality to meet its goal
through less restrictive means.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
47. See supra text accompanying note 11.
48. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
49. Id. at 369.
50. Id.
51. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
52. Id. at 162-63.
See Note, Time, Place, & Manner Regulations of Expressive Activities in the Public
Forum, 61 NEB. L. REv. 167 (1982). The Note reads in pertinent part:
In Heffron, Justice White's majority opinion dismissed in a single paragraph the
possibility that the state's interest could be served by a less broad, more closely
tailored rule than one effecting a total ban on the distribution and solicitation
activities of ISKCON members and other persons from the open areas of the
state fairgrounds. By failing to carefully consider whether a more narrowly
drafted rule could adequately promote the state's interest in crowd control, the
Court in effect dropped the first amendment out of its analysis, for it is the third
step of the Grayned formulation that reflects a sensitivity to the freedom of




In Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Watt,53 the court
of appeals told the Park Service to protect the parks in a less re-
strictive manner than through a total ban on camping. The court
supported its mandate by reference to the O'Brien "no greater [re-
striction] than is essential" test.54 The court of appeals, in a foot-
note, expressly rejected the suggestion that the Court in Heifron
had abandoned the O'Brien less restrictive means requirement."5
The dissent did not challenge the appropriateness of the less re-
strictive means test; it merely argued that there were no appropri-
ate less restrictive means available.
5
6
On appeal, the Supreme Court said the Park Service need not
formulate a less restrictive alternative to the ban on camping.
57 It
said any possible alternative "would still curtail the total allowable
expression" of demonstrators. 8 Such suggestions of alternatives,
according to the Court, amounted to nothing more than disagree-
ment with the Park Service as to the means and levels of protec-
tion that it should accord to the parks. Significantly, the Court
concluded its less restrictive alternative discussion with a dis-
claimer that the judiciary did not possess the authority, wisdom, or
competence to oversee the protection of the parks.
5 9
What then, is the present place of the less restrictive means
53. 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
54. The court stated that the Park Service's administrative difficulties in dealing with
problems caused by camping demonstrators "must be found wanting under O'Brien's 'no
greater [restriction] than is essential' test; any interest in preventing other 'camping' activ-
ity can be furthered by a less restrictive means." Id. at 596-97.
55. The footnote reads, in relevant part:
It has been suggested by some that the Supreme Court in Heffron... signaled
a departure from the less restrictive means test of O'Brien. We find, however,
that the majority in Heffron did apply the test to the regulation of ISKCON's
activities. The Court examined the alternatives put forward by ISK-
CON-penalizing disorder, limiting the number of people authorized to conduct
the activity, restricting the activity to certain locations within the forum-and
concluded that "it is quite improbable that the alternative means . . . would
deal with the problems posed. ... Such is not the case here; the alternative
put forward in Heffron itself, for instance, would better serve the Park Service's
interests than a total ban on sleep and would be less restrictive of the first
amendment activity proposed ....
703 F.2d at 597 n.28 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 621.
57. 104 S. Ct. at 3072.
58. Id.
59. The Court's exact words were: "We do not believe, however, that either United
States v. O'Brien or the time, place, and manner decisions assign to the judiciary the au-
thority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or endow the judi-
ciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that
level of conservation is to be attained." 104 S. Ct. at 3072.
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analysis in the time, place, and manner and O'Brien tests? In Re-
gan v. Time,60 decided only weeks after CCNV, the Court partially
answered this question. Justice White, writing for the Court, stated
that "the less restrictive alternative analysis . . . has never been a
part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner
regulation." ' He wrote that it was "enough" if the end was legiti-
mate, and the means substantially served the end.2
Although Regan disposes of the question of less restrictive
means as applied to the time, place, and manner test, it does not
expressly dispose of the question in regard to the O'Brien test. The
language of the O'Brien test - "if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential""
- seems to call for a narrowness analysis. Yet, future cases may
hold otherwise, for several reasons.
First, no court has cited O'Brien as authority for the proposi-
tion that the government must identify and implement any feasi-
ble less restrictive means. Second, the Court in CCNV said the
time, place, and manner test was the equivalent of the O'Brien
test." In its words, the two tests were "little, if any, different."6 If
the O'Brien test is identical to the time, place, and manner test,
and if Justice White is correct in stating that the time, place, and
manner test does not require a less restrictive means analysis, then
perforce, the O'Brien test should not require a less restrictive
means analysis.
Even if the O'Brien test originally contemplated a less restric-
tive means analysis, the analysis could be subject to excision.66 Jus-
tice Rehnquist expressly stated: "I have some doubt that the first
enunciation of a group of tests such as those established in O'Brien
sets them in concrete for all time . . . .,, Such sentiment, coupled
with the Court's newfound reticence concerning its "authority,"
"wisdom," and "competence" to invalidate governmental regula-
tions, even when they implicate first amendment rights, points to a
60. 104 S. Ct. 3262 (1984).
61. Id. at 3271-72.
62. Id.
63. 391 U.S. at 376.
64. 104 S. Ct. at 3071.
65. Id.
66. It may be that in Regan, Justice White effected a change by removing a less restric-
tive means analysis from the time, place, and manner test. Such an analysis may have been
inherent in the test. In Schneider v. State, a prototype time, place, and manner case, the
Court applied a less restrictive means analysis, and based its holding on the perceived fail-
ure of the regulation to meet the requirement. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
67. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 599 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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narrowing of judicial review of such regulations.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Court made a noteworthy choice of terms in its disclaimer
in CCNV.68 "Authority," "wisdom," and "competence" are terms
pregnant with connotations. They are the buzz-words of "anti-
Lochnerism."69 Since the demise of economic due process, 0 the
words have signaled judicial overreaching into areas that are these
proper domain of the political process. A court that exceeds the
bounds of judicial wisdom and competence is guilty of committing
judicial legislation, of usurping the function of the political process
by substituting its own judgement for that of the legislature.
The relationship between economic due process and the first
amendment may seem attenuated, but the Court has intertwined
the two concepts in the past. The Justices who were dissenters
during the Lochner71 era were able to use the logic of economic due
process to win judicial protection for certain first amendment free-
68. See supra note 59.
69. In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a state labor law which limited the
number of hours that bakery employees could work. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court stated,
"The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 53.
The Court saw the case as pitting "the power of the State to legislate" against "the right of
the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract." Id. at 57. The Court further
stated:
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this
character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is
sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty
Id. at 56.
Justice Harlan, in dissent, said that the determination of the reasonableness of legisla-
tion rested with the legislature, not with the courts:
If the end which the legislature seeks to accomplish be one to which its power
extends, and if the means employed to that end, although not the wisest or best,
are yet not plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then the court cannot
interfere. ...
• ..Under our system of government the courts are not concerned with the
wisdom or policy of legislation.
Id. at 68-69.
70. The term "economic due process" describes use of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to strike down state economic laws. For a discussion on the demise
of economic due process, see Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminisence, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1982).
71. See supra note 58.
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doms. In Near v. Minnesota7 2 in 1931, and again in Grosjean v.
American Press Co.73 in 1936, the Court engaged in a form of
"Lochnerizing" when it extended freedom of the press. In 1937, in
De Jonge v. Oregon,74 the Court used the same approach to but-
tress the right to peaceable assembly. In 1937, however, the Court
retreated from economic due process which "ended this free ride
on the coat-tails of the more tradition bound Brothers. 7 5 Al-
though the Court rejected heightened judicial scrutiny in cases of
economic legislation, Justice Stone, in footnote four of his opinion
in United States v. Carolene Products,76 sought to assure that de-
cisions like Carolene Products did not slam the door on the emerg-
ing civil liberties.
7
The divergence of values that surfaced in Carolene Products
surfaced again in two later cases involving flag salutes. In Miners-
ville School District v. Gobitis,7" in 1940, the Court upheld a
school board decision to exclude Jehovah's Witness students from
school for refusing to salute the flag. In West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette,"7 in 1943, the Court completely reversed
itself. In both cases, Jehovah's Witnesses challenged compulsory
flag salute statutes. Both cases deal with judicial and legislative
competency in dealing with first amendment and due process
issues.80
Justice Frankfurter opened the Gobitis opinion by stating that
the case presented a clear statement of the conflict between liberty
and governmental authority. He said: "A grave responsibility con-
fronts this Court whenever in course of litigating it must reconcile
the conflicting claims of liberty and authority. But when the lib-
erty involved is liberty of conscience, and the authority is author-
ity to safeguard the nation's fellowship, judicial conscience is put
to its severest test."81 After identifying national unity as the pre-
72. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
73. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
74. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
75. Lusky, supra note 70, at 1095.
76. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
77. The famous Carolene footnote reads in part: "There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within the specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amend-
ments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."
Id. at 152 n.4.
78. 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (overruled by 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
79. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
80. Id. at 638-39; 310 U.S. at 594-95.
81. 310 U.S. at 591.
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dominant value, Justice Frankfurter concluded that it was the leg-
islature's task to determine how to attain that end, not the Court's.
He said the courtroom was not the proper arena for debating is-
sues of educational policy. The Court had no authority in the area
of education, and therefore, the Court could not judge the wisdom
of the legislature in choosing the means.8'
Justice Stone, in dissent in Gobitis, pointed to the Carolene
Products footnote message concerning "the importance of a
searching judicial inquiry into the legislative judgment in situa-
tions where prejudice ...may tend to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect mi-
norities."s Justice Stone did not perceive the interest in national
unity to be an absolute value insulated from judicial scrutiny. 4
Three years later in Barnette5 Justice Stone's view prevailed.
In Barnette, the Court overruled Gobitis. In the Barnette opinion,
the Court announced that it was determining the constitutionality,
not the wisdom, of the flag salute statute.8 6 For this reason, the
Court's inquiry was within its competence.
Courts have continued to apply substantive due process analy-
sis to "fundamental rights issues, 87 but the process has not been
unopposed. 8 Justice Frankfurter mounted an attack on the
82. Id. at 598.
83. Id. at 606-07.
84. Id.
85. 319 U.S. at 630-34.
86. Id. at 639. The Court, according to Justice Jackson, had a duty to the Constitution
that it could not shirk:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. at 638.
87. The phrase "substantive due process" identifies the notion that the "due process"
guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments mandate not only that every citizen
have his legal rights determined through standard procedural measures, but also that the
government cannot abridge certain "fundamental rights" consistent with due process. For
an article in opposition to this notion, see Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and
the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1971? B.Y.U. L. R.v. 43.
88. Justice McReynolds, whom Justice Black once typified as the epitome of the due
process judiciary, made a most ironic comment in dissent in Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, the Cotyrt struck down local laws that repressed free-
dom of speech and assembly. Id. at 532. Justice McReynolds, who had so often been accused
of imposing his "wisdom" in areas where the Court was not "competent" to make determi-
nations, said, "Wise management of such intimate local affairs, generally at least, is beyond
the competency of federal courts, and essays in that direction should be avoided." Id.
19851
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The Court has used "anti-Lochner" language to attack extensions of "fundamental
rights." The Court struck down a Texas criminal abortion statute in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Doe v. Bolton,
Justice White, joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist, said, "[T]he upshot [was] that the
people and the legislatures of the 50 States [were] constitutionally disentitled to weigh the
relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus on the one
hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand." 410 U.S. at
222.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roe v. Wade, bore in mind "Mr. Justice
Holmes' admonition in his now vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York." 410 U.S. at 117
(citation omitted). Despite the plethora of opinions, it was clear to all that the Roe v. Wade
decision determined an allocation of authority. Professor Ely, in a reference to the Carolene
Products footnote, stated that it was Justice Stone's suggestion that "constitutional direc-
tive or not, the Court should throw its weight on the side of a minority demanding in court
more than it was able to achieve politically." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 934 (1973). Commenting on Roe v. Wade, Professor Ely
pointed out that although there were very few women in the legislatures, "no fetuses sit in
our legislatures." Id. at 933.
Professor Tribe spoke more directly to the point:
The Court was not, after all, choosing simply between the alternatives of abor-
tion and continued pregnancy. It was instead choosing among alternative allo-
cations of decisionmaking authority, for the issue it faced was whether the wo-
man and her doctor, rather than an agency of government, should have the
authority to make the abortion decision at various stages of pregnancy.
Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 11 (1973) (emphasis added).
In another case, Chief Justice Burger dissented from the Court's opinion, which struck
down a state law that forbade distribution of birth control devices to unmarried persons. He
too saw the issue as one of allocation of decisionmaking authority: "[T]hese opinions seri-
ously invade the constitutional prerogatives of the States and regrettably hark back to the
heyday of substantive due process." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 467 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
In dissent in several cases extending aliens' rights, certain Justices have attacked the
substantive due process approach to fundamental rights. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court af-
firmed the obligation of a state to provide an education, at its own expense, to "undocu-
mented children." 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, dissented:
Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without
hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children
. . . of an elementary education. . . . However, the Constitution does not consti-
tute us as "Platonic Guardians" nor does it vest in this Court the authority to
strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desireable social
policy, "wisdom," or "common sense." We trespass on the assigned function of
the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when
we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.
Id. at 242 (Burger, J., dissenting).
In Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court ruled that aliens must have equal rights to receive
employment within the civil service. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, at-
tacked the underpinnings of the Court's opinion:
On the "authority" of this footnote, which only four Members of the Court in
Carolene Products joined, the Court in [one of the cases cited] merely stated
that "classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect" because
"[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority. ..
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Carolene Products footnote in Kovacs v. Cooper.89 In Kovacs, a
first amendment case, the Court upheld a statute banning the
broadcasting of messages from loudspeakers mounted on vehicles.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment, took the opportu-
nity to object to the majority's reference to the "preferred position
of freedom of speech" which had "uncritically crept into some re-
cent opinions of this Court."90
Justice Black continued the battle against substantive due
process in Tinker v. Des Moines.e" The majority expressed its
opinion that the case's controlling principle was that "First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to students and teachers.
92
Justice Black, in dissent, stated that the Court had long since re-
pudiated the notion that judges could overrule legislators when
laws struck them as unreasonable. He characterized the Court's ac-
tion (voiding the antiarmband rule) as a return to "the McReyn-
olds due process concept."' 3
Chief Justice Burger echoed similar sentiments in his dissent
in Spence v. Washington." Spence was convicted for taping a
peace symbol to a United States flag in violation of a state statute.
for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Id. at 656 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun took a swipe at substantive due process in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972). The majority struck down capital punishment. Justice Blackmun, in dis-
sent, said:
[W]ere I a legislator, I would do all I could to sponsor and to vote for legislation
abolishing the death penalty .... There--on the Legislative Branch of the
State or Federal Government, and secondarily, on the Executive Branch-is
where the authority and responsibility for this kind of action lies. The authority
should not be taken over by the judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth
Amendment issue.
I do not sit on these cases, however, as a legislator, responsive, at least in part, to
the will of constituents. Our task here ... is to pass upon the constitutionality
of legislation that has been enacted and that is challenged. This is the sole task
for judges. We should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of
legislative and congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to guide our
judicial decision in cases such as these.
Id. at 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Justice Frankfurter said: "A footnote hardly seems to be an
appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional doctrine, and the Carolene footnote did
not purport to announce any new doctrine; incidentally, it did not have the concurrence of a
majority of the Court." Id. at 90-91 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 90.
91. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
92. Id. at 506.
93. Id. at 520. For a brief discussion on McReynolds's view, see supra note 88.
94. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
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The Court held that the first amendment protected the expressive
act, and that "no interest the State may have in preserving the
physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly im-
paired on these facts . . . ."I Chief Justice Burger disagreed. He
said, "If the constitutional role of this Court were to strike down
unwise laws or restrict unwise application of some laws, I could
agree with the result reached by the Court. This is not our func-
tion, however, and it should be left to each State and ultimately to
the common sense of its people to decide how the flag. . . should
be protected. '""
The preceding analysis indicates that there has always been an
undercurrent of dissatisfaction within the Court, because of the
Court's high degree of scrutiny of alleged infringements of first
amendment rights in cases that challenge neutral statutes. In the
CCNV case, the minority undercurrent rose to the surface and be-
came the majority. The terms "wisdom" and "competence" stand
out in CCNV because the Court has not used these words to up-
hold a governmental regulation in the face of a first amendment
challenge since the Gobitis case in 1940.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the time, place, and manner test and the O'Brien test, a
governmental regulation which incidentally limits free speech must
further a substantial governmental interest. Yet in truth, the Court
subjects only the "furtherance" aspect to scrutiny; the Court is not
likely to evaluate the underlying "interest." The Court has given a
broad reading to the scope of "furtherance." Using the Heffron ap-
proach, which was reaffirmed in CCNV, the Court looks to the
overall effect of a regulation rather than confining its inquiry to
the case at hand. If application of a regulation, in general, will
have its intended effect, the Court will uphold the regulation even
though the regulation only results in minimal furtherance of the
asserted governmental interest in the case before the Court.
The tests also require the challenged regulation to be narrowly
drawn. It is hard to see, however, how this narrowness requirement
protects first amendment claimants. The Court will not engage in a
less restrictive means analysis. Nor is the Court eager to substitute
its own "judgment" or "wisdom" for that of a governmental
95. Id. at 415.
96. Id. at 416.
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agency. In CCNV, the Court took the unprecedented position that
such matters, even when they implicate first amendment rights,
may not be within the Court's "competence."
As applied in CCNV, neither the time, place, and manner test
nor the O'Brien test, present much of a hurdle for a governmental
entity to clear in justifying a regulation that incidentally limits ex-
pressive conduct. The Court does not read these tests as written.
As construed, these tests add up to less than the sum of their
parts.
JAMES B. PUTNEY
